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NOTES AND COMMENTS
PROSPECTIVE REMEDIES UNDER SECTION 5
OF THE NATURAL GAS ACT: OFFICE OF
CONSUMERS' COUNSEL v. FERC
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 5 of the Natural Gas Act (NGA)1 protects consumers from
excessive rates and charges in gas purchase contracts. 2 Section 5' per-
mits the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (the FERC), on its own
motion or upon a third party complaint, to hold a hearing to determine
whether rates, classifications, rules, regulations, practices, or contracts
relating to jurisdictional transactions are unjust, unreasonable, unduly
discriminatory, or preferential.4 If the FERC finds a violation, it orders
a change to the lowest reasonable rate or to a just rate.' The court's goal
in providing a remedy under section 5 is to place the affected party in the
same position it would have occupied had the violation not occurred.6
Although the FERC has traditionally ordered only prospective rem-
edies upon finding a section 5 violation,' Office of Consumers' Counsel v.
FERC 8 (Consumers' Counsel II) emerged as a departure from this tradi-
tional approach. The petitioners in Consumers' Counsel II stated that
the FERC failed to follow properly the mandate in Office of Consumers'
Counsel v. FERC9 (Consumers' Counsel I), which required the FERC to
issue a remedy for a section 5 violation.10 The FERC maintained that
before it could comply with the court's mandate, it had to hold a hearing
1. The Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 717-717w (1982)).
2. Public Serv. Comm'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 543 F.2d 757, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (quot-
ing Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1959)).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 717d (1982).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a) (1982).
5. Id.
6. Office of Consumers' Counsel v. FERC, 826 F.2d 1136, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [hereinafter
Consumers' Counsel II] (citing Tennessee Valley Mun. Gas Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 470
F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
7. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959).
8. Consumers' Counsel II, 826 F.2d 1136.
9. Office of Consumers' Counsel v. FERC, 783 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Con-
sumers' Counsel I].
10. Consuners' Counsel II, 826 F.2d at 1139.
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to determine whether the section 5 violations continued to exist. If the
FERC determined that there were no present violations, it would not
grant a remedy.11
The issue before the Consumers' Counsel II court involved the pro-
spective nature of section 5 remedies.12 The court concluded that when
the FERC commits legal error in a section 5 proceeding, the proper rem-
edy puts the parties in the position they would have been in had the error
not been committed."3 Thus, a remedy may be applied prospectively
from the date of the earlier legal error. The retroactive nature of the
remedy in Consumers' Counsel II expanded the relief available to a gas
purchaser when a gas supplier violates section 5.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
In 1981, Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation (Columbia) filed
two purchased gas adjustments (PGA)'4 with the FERC.' 5 Columbia
sought to recover $625 million in costs of purchasing natural gas by in-
creasing the rates charged to customers.16 Several customers challenged
the PGA filings, alleging that Columbia's practices were abusive.17 The
FERC held a hearing to determine the merit of those allegations.1
In response to the hearing, the FERC issued Opinion 204,19 which
developed and applied a two-part test for "abuse ' 20 under section
11. Id. at 1138-39.
12. Id. at 1138.
13. Id. at 1139 (citing Tennessee Valley Mun. Gas Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 470 F.2d
46 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
14. In 1972, the Federal Power Commission established the Purchased Gas Adjustment (PGA)
alternative for adjusting pipeline rates. Rather than a full section 4 review under the NGA, the PGA
alternative allows interstate pipelines to submit a special purchased gas adjustment filing biannually
to adjust their rates for increases or decreases in the cost of gas they purchase from suppliers. 18
C.F.R. § 154.38(d)(4) (1986). The PGA alternative allows pipelines to estimate their purchase costs
for a six month period and, if accepted by the FERC, will collect them from their rate payers. After
the six month lapse, the actual gas purchase costs are compared to the estimated costs. If the actual
costs exceed the estimated costs, then the pipeline is allowed to make up the difference through a
surcharge. If the estimated costs are greater than the actual costs a refund is made by the pipeline to
the ratepayer. 18 C.F.R. § 154.38(d)(4)(iv)(d) (1987). However, the pipeline must file a full section
4 review after three years. 18 C.F.R. § 154(d)(4)(vi)(a) (1987).
15. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 16 F.E.R.C. 61,358 (1981); Columbia Gas Transmis-
sion Corp., 14 F.E.R.C. 61,379 (1981).
16. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 26 F.E.R.C. 61,093 (1984) [hereinafter Opinion 204].
17. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 14 F.E.R.C. at 61,380.
18. Id.
19. Opinion 204, 26 F.E.R.C. 61,093.
20. Id. at 61,100.
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601(c)(2) of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA).21 The first
part of the test required a showing of reckless disregard of the pipeline's
fundamental duty to provide service at the lowest reasonable cost. The
second part of the test required proof of significant adverse consequences
on customers or consumers. Columbia's practices were not abusive
under the test. Although Columbia did act with reckless disregard when
it failed to consider the marketability of the gas it purchased, the second
part of the test was not met. None of Columbia's practices rose to the
level of abuse because Columbia's customers had not suffered significant
adverse consequences.22
Although Columbia's practices were not abusive under the NGPA,
Columbia did violate section 5 of the NGA. Columbia's failure to con-
sider marketability in making purchases was imprudent. Furthermore,
the FERC determined that high take or pay23 provisions in Columbia's
contracts with gas producers also violated section 5.24
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reviewed Opinion
204. In Consumers' Counsel I, the court affirmed in part and reversed
and remanded in part Opinion 204.25 The court affirmed the FERC's
finding that two aspects of Columbia's gas acquisition practices violated
section 5 of the NGA.26 More particularly, Columbia failed to consider
what effect competition from alternate fuels would have on its customers
and its ability to sell in the open market.27 In addition, Columbia's high
take or pay requirements were unreasonable. 28 Although it agreed with
the FERC's findings of facts, the court ruled that the FERC had failed to
21. 15 U.S.C. § 3431 (1982). For a more in-depth analysis of the "abuse" test under section
601(c)(2) of the Natural Gas Policy Act, see Note, A Test For Abuse Under NPGA Section 601(c)(2):
Office of Consumers' Counsel v. FERC, 8 ENERGY L.J. 93 (1987); Note, The Definition of Abuse
Under The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978: Office of Consumers' Counsel v. FERC, 22 TULSA L.J.
625 (1987).
22. Opinion No. 204, 26 F.E.R.C. at 61,103.
23. Id. at 61,112, 61,120.
24. Id. at 61,120.
25. Consumers' Counsel I, 783 F.2d 206, 235-36 (D.C. Cir. 1986). In Opinion No. 204, the
FERC ordered Columbia to "take all reasonable action to mitigate the effect of take or pay provi-
sions of its section 107 contracts," and adopted a contested offer of settlement made by Columbia in
a Section 4 rate case covering the period from June 1, 1983 to April 30, 1984. Opinion No. 204, 26
F.E.R.C. at 61,126. The issue in Consumers' Counsel 11 was limited to FERC's compliance with the
court's mandate that the Commission impose a remedy for Columbia's take or pay clauses. The
court in Consumers' Counsel II stated that "while we therefore address only this issue our discussion
of the nature of prospectivity for purposes of Section 5 remedies should also guide the Commission
in its consideration of the other outstanding issues." Consumers' Counsel I1, 826 F.2d 1136, 1138 n. 1
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
26. Consumers' Counsel 1, 783 F.2d at 236.
27. Id. at 224.
28. Id. at 229.
1988]
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impose a proper remedy for section 5 violations, and remanded the case
back to the FERC.29 The FERC's remedy in Opinion 204 for violations
attributed to high take or pay clauses in Columbia's gas purchase con-
tracts30 was insufficient.
According to Consumers' Counsel 1, the FERC had failed to prop-
erly exercise its authority under section 5. Before granting a remedy
under section 5, the FERC must follow two steps.3 First, the FERC
must find that an existing condition is unjust or discriminatory, and sec-
ond, the FERC must prescribe a remedy for that violation.32  The
FERC's mere urging that Columbia mitigate its contractual terms was
"devoid" of a remedy.33 When the FERC has found a clear violation, it
has an affirmative duty to issue a remedy.34 Further, the court stated
that in reformulating its remedies on remand, "the Commission should
adhere to the strictures of section 5 of the NGA which stipulates that
FERC shall determine and order 'the just and reasonable... practic[e]
or contract to be thereafter observed.' ,131
Pursuant to the court's mandate in Consumers' Counsel I, the
FERC issued its Order on Remand, Denying Motions and Establishing
Hearing Procedures (Order on Remand).36 In its Order on Remand, the
FERC maintained that because remedies for a section 5 violation can be
implemented only on a prospective basis, a hearing must be held to deter-
mine if those violations are continuing at the present time. Only if the
violations continue to exist would the FERC impose a remedy. 37
- On August 25, 1987, the Associate Gas Distributors (AGD), dissat-
isfied with the FERC's Order on Remand, petitioned the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals to enforce the mandate issued by the court in
Consumers' Counsel L38 AGD argued that the prospective nature of sec-
tion 5 relief meant that the FERC was powerless to order reparation for
illegal practices that existed prior to the FERC's finding of illegality. 39
As a result, AGD maintained that a remedy imposed as of the date of the
29. Id. at 235-36.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 233-34.
32. Id. at 234.
33. Id. at 235-36.
34. Id. at 236.
35. Further, the court stressed "that the Commission must consider the entire record as a
whole, then act pursuant to reasoned decisionmaking and abjure reliance on any ex parte or extra
record evidentiary submissions." Id.
36. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 39 F.E.R.C. 61,776 (1987).
37. Id. at 61,777.
38. Consumers' Counsel II, 826 F.2d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
39. Id. at 1138-39. On January 16, 1984, the Commission had determined that the take or pay
Vol. 23:613
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FERC's finding of illegality was a prospective remedy.' To address
AGD's claims, the court had to interpret the prospective nature of the
section 5 remedies.41
B. Issue
The issue in Consumers' Counsel II was whether a section 5 remedy
could ever be applied retroactively to cure legal errors committed in the
past by the FERC.42 Relying on a liberal interpretation of section 5's
language, the court held that the FERC can grant a remedy retroactively
to cure legal errors which have prolonged a section 5 proceeding.43
III. BACKGROUND
Traditionally, section 5 remedies' have had only prospective ef-
fect;45 the FERC is powerless under section 5 to make reparation or-
ders.46 Under the NGA, the FERC is prohibited from retroactively
applying a "new rate" under section 5.47 The NGA requires the "new
rate" established by the FERC to be enforced prospectively.48 Thus, sec-
tion 5 apparently leaves no opportunity for the FERC to grant a retroac-
tive remedy.
Administrative orders which operate retroactively generally require
careful scrutiny.49 This rule allows an entity to rely upon an administra-
tive agency's order, and also protects expectations under existing rate
clauses in Columbia's gas contracts were illegal. Opinion No. 204, 26 F.E.R.C. 61,093, 61,120
(1984).
40. Consumers' Counsel II, 826 F.2d at 1139.
41. Id. at 1138.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1138-39.
44. Section 5 reads in relevant part as follows:
Whenever the Commission... shall find that any... practice, or contract affecting [a rate
charged by a natural gas company for sale of gas subject to Commission jurisdiction] ... is
unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential, the Commission shall deter-
mine the just and reasonable... practice or contract to be thereafter observed and in force
and shall fix the same by order ....
Id. at 1138 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a) (1982) (emphasis by the court)). The FERC argued and
the court affirmed that the use of the word "thereafter" means "that section 5 remedies can have
prospective effect only." Id. at 1138.
45. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
46. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. FERC, 590 F.2d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 1979).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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schedules." Thus, final rate orders may only be changed prospectively.5'
However, strict adherence to this approach conflicts with established
FERC guidelines.
When the FERC commits legal error in a section 5 case, the proper
remedy puts the parties in the position that they would have been in had
the error not occurred.52 Therefore, a remedy may be applied retroac-
tively. 3 When applied to section 5 cases involving legal errors commit-
ted by the FERC, retroactive relief does not conflict with the anti-
reparations language of Section 5.54
Tennessee Valley Municipal Gas Association v. Federal Power Com-
mission 55 illustrates how a court can grant relief prospectively from the
date of the FERC's legal error. In Tennessee Valley, the FERC56 had
erroneously dismissed a section 5 proceeding. Five months later, the
FERC vacated its dismissal and reopened the proceedings to determine
the correct rate. The petitioner argued that the FERC erred in its dis-
missal of the section 5 proceeding and that the legal rate, as determined
by the FERC, should be applied retroactively as of the day the error was
made. 7
Although the court found that retroactive relief was appropriate, it
disagreed with the petitioners regarding the appropriate measure of re-
lief.58 In order to cure the FERC's legal error, the court measured the
retroactivity of the remedy from the time elapsed between the FERC's
wrongful dismissal of the section 5 proceeding, and the time the FERC
corrected its error by vacating the dismissal and reopening the hear-
ings.59 By measuring relief from the date of the FERC's legal error, the
court placed the injured party in the position it would have been in had
50. Id. (quoting Tennessee Valley Mun. Gas Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 470 F.2d 446,
452 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
51. Id.
52. Tennessee Valley Mun. Gas Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 470 F.2d 446, 452 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 470 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
56. In 1977, the FPC became the FERC. Thus, Tennessee Valley's reference to the FPC is
equivalent to the FERC.
57. Id. at 450.
58. Id. at 453.
59. Id. at 452. The Commission dismissed the section 5 proceeding on October 17, 1969. On
February 6, 1970, the Commission vacated its dismissal, making the elapsed period 112 days. The
petitioner urged the court to retroactively apply the just rate as of October 17, 1969 on the basis of
two alternative theories. First, the petitioner argued that the decision should be based on the record
as it stood in October 1969. The FPC can only correct that error by deciding the fair rate on the
basis of a 1966 test period and ordering refunds as if that decision had been made in 1969. Second,
Vol. 23:613
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the error never occurred.6" Thus, gas purchasers are protected from
legal errors committed by the FERC.61
Retroactive relief from the FERC's legal errors is consistent with
the anti-reparation language of section 5,62 which protects "established
expectations under legally established rate schedules., 63 Although rates
established by the FERC at one proceeding may later prove to be exces-
sive, a gas purchaser is not entitled to relief until the FERC determines
that the rates violate section 5. Thus, a purchaser is not entitled to a
remedy during a section 5 proceeding. 64 However, when a section 5 pro-
ceeding is delayed due to FERC's legal error, there is no reason to deny
the purchaser a remedy from the date of the legal error.65 The tradi-
tional rule forbidding a remedy is not applicable because there are no
justified expectations under the FERC's legal error.
IV. THE DECISION IN CONSUMERS'
The court in Consumers' Counsel 11 adopted the rule that when legal
error is committed in a section 5 proceeding, the proper remedy must put
the parties in the position that they would have occupied had the error
not occurred.66 The Consumers' Counsel I1 court found legal error in the
FERC's failure in January 1984 to grant relief from Columbia's high take
or pay clauses.67 Thus, the court ordered the FERC to impose the ap-
propriate remedy as of January 16, 1984, in order to place Columbia's
customers in the same position they would have occupied had the error
not been made.68
V. ANALYSIS
In Consumers' Counsel II, the court exercised its equitable powers to
remedy errors committed by the FERC.69 The decision provides relief
the petitioner suggested that if the record was stale, the staleness was due to the inexcusable inactiv-
ity of the FERC, and therefore the court should give full retroactivity to October 1969. Id. at 452-
53.
60. Id. at 453.
61. Id. at 452-53.
62. Id. at 452.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 452-53.
66. Consumers' Counsel II, 826 F.2d 1136, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Thus, the Consumers' court
adopted the approach taken in Tennessee Valley, 470 F.2d 446.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. v. FPC, 502 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Indiana &
Michigan, the court stated that "[a] court sitting in review of an administrative agency is vested with
1988]
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from the traditional prospective application of remedies under section 5.
In allowing retroactive relief, the court was concerned with protecting
gas purchasers from legal error which wrongfully and unfairly prolongs a
section 5 proceeding.70
The court in Consumers' Counsel II acknowledged the general prin-
ciple that, due to the prospective nature of section 5 remedies, gas pur-
chasers are not entitled to protection from excessive charges during the
pendency of a section 5 proceeding.7' However, relief will be available if
the FERC commits legal error which prolongs the section 5 proceed-
ing.72 The court then grants relief prospectively from the date of the
legal error.7 3 In effect, this is a retroactive remedy. By granting relief
retroactively, the court places purchasers in the position they would have
been in had the FERC not committed legal error.
The court's ruling in Consumers' Counsel II may raise concerns
about a gas supplier's protection from rate charges during the full pen-
dency of a section 5 proceeding.74 The longer it takes to find legal error,
the more of a burden the gas supplier will bear when retroactive relief is
ordered. The court in Consumers' Counsel II ordered the FERC to apply
the appropriate rate prospectively from the date the FERC initially
found that Columbia's practices violated section 5. The order over-
looked the fact that the proceeding may have been prolonged for reasons
other than the FERC's legal error. The question arises as to how broadly
the court should define legal error. For example, had Consumers' Coun-
sel II been prolonged due to the procedural right of the gas supplier to
appeal, rather than legal error, the gas purchaser would not have been
entitled to retroactive relief. However, if such an appeal is eventually
denied a court could simply rule that legal error was committed when the
actual violation was found, and thus grant retroactive relief. In effect,
equity powers which it may [adjust] to the exigencies of the case in accordance with the equitable
principles governing judicial action." Id. at 346. Still, a court must act within the bounds of the
statute and without intruding upon the administrative expertise.
70. Consumers' Counsel II, 826 F.2d at 1139. It has also been recognized that section 5 pro-
ceedings can be "nigh indeterminable." Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378
(1959). In Consumers' Counsel II, the court noted that the Commission is in a position to correct
what is wrongfully done by virtue of its order. Consumers' Counsel II, 826 F.2d at 1139 (citing
United Gas Improvement Co. v. Callery Properties, Inc. 382 U.S. 223 229 (1965)).
71. Consumers' Counsel I, 826 F.2d at 1139.
72. The court, citing Tennessee Valley, stated that "there is no reason to extend that principle
to say that gas purchasers have no protection against legal error by the Commission which wrong-
fully and unfairly prolongs that pendency." Id.
73. Id.
74. The issue of whether Columbia's practices violated section 5 were also an issue in Consum-
ers' Counsel I. Therefore, it would be argued that the section 5 proceeding was still pending as of
February 4, 1986.
Vol. 23:613
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the order burdens gas suppliers by forcing them to retroactively adjust
rates charged during a rehearing regarding the section 5 violation.75
Concern with protecting gas purchasers is further highlighted when
a court is faced with the prospect of applying a rate increase retroactively
in favor of the gas supplier. In this scenario, courts have been reluctant
to give retroactive effect to a rate increase. The rationale behind this
reluctance is that the NGA bars a regulated seller of natural gas from
collecting a rate other than one filed with the FERC. Furthermore, the
FERC itself is prevented from imposing a rate increase for gas already
sold.76 To allow retroactive application of a rate increase for gas already
sold would circumvent the uniform regulatory scheme of the NGA.77
Courts have recognized other situations where retroactive relief for
gas purchasers is appropriate. The FERC has retroactive rate making
authority to order natural gas producers to make refunds under Section
4(e) of the NGA,78 which provides that modification of natural gas rates
in a proceeding to review newly filed rates may be made retroactive
through the refund power of the FERC.79 That rate will be given retro-
active effect from the date that the increased rates become effective. s0
The refund order recognized in section 4(e) relates to section 5 with
75. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571 (1981). In Arkansas Louisiana Gas, the
gas supplier and gas purchaser entered into a contract for the sale of gas. The contract contained a
fixed price schedule and a "favored nations clause," which provided that if the purchaser purchased
gas from another party at a higher rate than it was paying gas suppliers, then the suppliers would be
entitled to a higher price for their sales to gas purchasers. Gas suppliers filed their contract and rates
with the FPC. Later, gas purchasers purchased certain leases from another and began producing gas
on its leasehold. Gas suppliers filed an action alleging that such lease payments triggered the favored
nations clause. Because gas purchasers had not increased payments to gas suppliers as required by
the contract, the suppliers sought damages in equaling the difference between the price they actually
were paid in the intervening years and the price they would have paid had the clause gone into effect.
The Louisiana Supreme Court's decision awarded such damages amounting to "nothing less than
the award of a retroactive rate increase based on speculation about what the Commission might have
done had it been faced with the facts of this case." Id. at 578-79. In contrast, the United States
Supreme Court criticized the Louisiana ruling because the decision undermined the legislative
scheme of the NGA. Id. at 579, 581-82.
76. Id. at 578.
77. Id. at 579.
78. 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1982).
79. Section 4 requires natural gas companies to file all rates and contracts with the FERC. 15
U.S.C. § 717c(c) (1982). Any changes in previously filed rates or contracts must be filed with the
FERC at least 30 days before they are to go into effect and, except in the case of industrial rates, the
Commission may suspend the operation of the new rate pending a determination of its reasonable-
ness. Id. at § 717c(d). If a decision has not been reached before the period of suspension expires (a
maximum of 5 months), the filed rate must be allowed to go into effect, but the FERC's order may be
made retroactive to that date. Id. at § 717c(e).
80. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FERC, 791 F.2d 803, 807 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 907 (1987).
9
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regard to newly changed gas rates.81 The FERC's power with regard to
rate setting is defined by section 4(e) and section 5(a) of the NGA. Sec-
tion 5 allows the FERC to set aside and modify any rate or contract
which it determines to be unreasonable or unjust.82 If the rates are un-
lawful, section 5 allows the FERC to adjust the rate prospectively. 3 Sec-
tion 5 applies to all the rates of a natural gas company, whether long
established or recently changed.84
Section 4(e) adds to the basic power granted in section 5. In case of
a newly changed rate (except industrial rates) or contract, the FERC is
empowered "(1) to preserve the status quo pending review of the new
rate by suspending its operation for a limited period, and (2) thereafter to
make its order retroactive, by means of the refund procedure, to the date
the change becomes effective." 85 This refund power allows the FERC to
compensate gas purchasers for overpayment of gas rates during the pen-
dency of a section 4 new rate determination. By allowing such retroac-
tive relief under both section 5 and section 4 of the NGA, the FERC is
enforcing the primary purpose of the NGA. The primary purpose of the
NGA is to protect consumers of natural gas from exploitation at the
hands of the natural gas companies.
8 6
VI. CONCLUSION
The court in Consumers' Counsel II held that when FERC commits
a legal error in deciding a section 5 case, the proper remedy puts the
affected parties in the same position that they would have occupied had
the violation not occurred. Such relief is consistent with the anti-repara-
tion language in Section 5. According to Consumers' Counsel II, reme-
dies are to be applied prospectively from the date that the FERC
determines that a gas suppliers' practices are in violation of section 5.
Such relief fulfills the primary purpose of the NGA.
Laurie L. Largent
81. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 341 (1956).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 610 (1944).
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